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11 Introduction
The relationship between ￿nancial development and economic growth
spurred a long lasting debate among economists. Classical contributions,
like Bagehot (1873) and Hicks (1969), argue that innovations in the
￿nancial structure in Britain, such as the introduction of the joint-stock
company and limited liability, favoured the ￿rst industrial revolution
by easing the funding of large scale investments. By the same token,
Schumpeter (1934) argues that ￿nancial development spurs economic
growth, not only making capital accumulation easier, but also favouring
the funding of innovations.
However, sceptical contributions have been o⁄ered too. It is well
known Joan Robinson￿ s dictum: ￿where enterprise leads, ￿nance follows￿
(Robinson, 1952). Another well known ￿nancial development sceptic
is Lucas (1988), dubbing as ￿over-stressed￿ the causality relationship
between ￿nance and growth.
The ￿nance-growth nexus has not received less attention in more re-
cent years. It is possible to distinguish various approaches that have
been reviewed in Levine (2004) and in Levine (2003), including both
theoretical and empirical studies. The latter ones ranged from histori-
cal case studies, to ￿rm-level studies, to time series studies on a single
country or on a limited number of countries, to cross-sectional and panel
data analyses.
Within the cross-sectional and panel data analyses, there have been
those focusing on industries, like Rajan and Zingales (1998), and those
focusing on countries. The literature review that follows deals mainly
with country cross-sectional or panel data studies considering ￿nancial
development as improvements in the working of banks, however there
are also other contributions considering ￿nancial development as insti-
tutional changes or deepening of the stock market (for instance Levine
and Zervos, 1998 or Beck and Levine, 2004 and others reviewed in Levine,
2004).
The aim of this paper is to o⁄er new perspectives on the long-lasting
debate above by analysing the e⁄ect of ￿nancial development, meant
as enlargement of the banking sector, on growth by using a regional
dataset. In this way, it will be possible to avoid pooling developed and
developing countries, where the economic mechanisms at stake may be
greatly di⁄erent. However, by focusing on a country, like Italy, where re-
gional disparities have been a long-lasting issue since the achievement of
national unity in 1860, it will be possible to keep a substantial variability
within the sample.
Moreover, Dri¢ l (2003) claims that the New Economic Geography,
relying on agglomeration and transport costs, may o⁄er more valuable
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plain economic growth. Therefore, a regional dataset may o⁄er valid
tests to thoroughly assess the ￿nance-growth nexus, all the more that,
as argued by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), it represents a limit
condition for international ￿nance markets given the high degree of in-
tegration of the various territorial units. Furthermore, with di⁄erence
to Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), I do not consider indicators of
￿nancial development deriving from micro data, rather, as it will ap-
pear later, I consider aggregate ones, directly concerning the size of the
banking sector.
Finally, given that the Bank of Italy collects ￿nancial data distin-
guishing between long and short term credit, it will be possible to assess
the impact of di⁄erent ￿nancial structures on the local growth rate. This
is particularly interesting because studies on ￿nancial structure usually
focus on its e⁄ect on ￿rm size or on the opportunities for ￿rm growth
more than on its aggregate e⁄ect on economic growth performance as
done here (Caprio and Demirg￿￿-Kunt, 1997).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. First there will be a
brief review of cross-section and panel data studies on the link between
￿nance and growth and on ￿rm debt structure in order to grasp what
could be the best speci￿cation for a model trying to explain these issues.
Afterwards, I will illustrate the collected data. Finally, I will consider
a cross-sectional analysis trying to understand if the level of ￿nancial
development at the beginning of the period of observation can be con-
sidered as a good predictor of the subsequent local growth rate. Given
the regional nature of the dataset, it is not possible to neglect the prob-
lem of spatial correlation between the di⁄erent provinces. Therefore, I
will explicitly test for spatial correlation in the residuals, that might lead
to biased standard errors and unreliable t-statistics.
Furthermore, in order to overcome the problems highlighted by Drif-
￿l (2003) and Manning (2003), I will group provinces in accordance to
the region they belong to and I will make use of the one way error
component model in order to control for possible omitted variables, also
testing if the Random E⁄ect or the Fixed E⁄ect estimator ￿ts the data
better and providing di⁄erent estimators in order to check for potential
model misspeci￿cations (Baltagi, 2003). I will also compare the instru-
mental variable estimator with the other estimators in order to account
for potential endogeneity problems.
2 Literature Review
Since the seminal contributions of King and Levine (1993a, b) new at-
tention has been devoted to the issue whether ￿nancial development is
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ies have followed di⁄ering for model speci￿cations and, consequently,
conclusions.
King and Levine (1993a, b, c), extending the analysis of Goldsmith
(1969), carry out a cross-sectional analysis of a dataset of 80 countries
over the period 1960 ￿1989 in order to answer the question whether
￿nancial development can be considered a predictor of future long-run
growth, not neglecting also its e⁄ect on capital accumulation and pro-
ductivity growth.
In particular four measures of the level of ￿nancial development are
proposed:
￿ DEPTH: capturing the size of ￿nancial intermediaries (liquid lia-
bilities of ￿nancial intermediaries over GDP);
￿ BANK: the ratio of private bank credit over the bank credit plus
central bank credit;
￿ PRIVATE: the ratio of the credit allocated to private enterprises
over the total domestic credit;
￿ PRIVY: the ratio of the credit to private enterprises over GDP;
The model speci￿cation is as follows:
G(j) = a + b[F(i)] + gX + e (1)
where G(j) is either per capita GDP growth, or per capita capital stock
growth or productivity growth; F(i) is either DEPTH or BANK or PRI-
VATE or PRIVY and X is a set of controls (income per capita, edu-
cation, political stability, indicators of exchange rate, trade, ￿scal and
monetary policy). These contributions conclude that the level of ￿nan-
cial development at the beginning of the period can be considered as a
good predictor of future economic growth.
More recently, much research e⁄ort has been devoted to analysing
potential biases deriving from the endogeneity of ￿nancial development
measures with respect to growth. Levine (1998, 1999) and Levine,
Loayza, and Beck (2000) use the La Porta et al. (1998) measures of legal
origin as instrumental variables. In particular, La Porta et al. (1998)
show that legal origin ￿whether a country￿ s Commercial/Company law
derives from British, French, German, or Scandinavian law ￿consid-
erably a⁄ects the letter and the enforcement of national credit laws,
achieving di⁄erent results in the protection of external investors and
promoting ￿nancial development to di⁄erent extents.
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generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator and considering a
model similar to (1), where G is real per capita GDP growth over the
1960-95 period. F(i), the measures of ￿nancial development, are instru-
mented with the legal origin indicators, Z. The variables included in
X, the conditioning set, are treated as exogenous ones. Levine, Loayza,
and Beck (2000) uses linear moment conditions, which amounts to the
requirement that the instrumental variables (Z) be uncorrelated with
the error term (e), implying that legal origin may a⁄ect per capita GDP
growth only through the ￿nancial development indicators and the vari-
ables in the conditioning information set, X.
Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) also covers a longer time span than
King and Levine (1993a,b), including the years from 1989 to 1995, it
better de￿ ates ￿nancial development indicators and it adds a new mea-
sure of overall ￿nancial development, called Private Credit. This new
measure of ￿nancial development equals the value of credits by ￿nancial
intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP and it is di⁄erent to
PRIVY above because this includes credits issued by the monetary au-
thority and government agencies, whereas Private Credit includes only
credits issued by banks and other ￿nancial intermediaries. The measure
isolates credit issued to the private sector and therefore excludes credit is-
sued to governments, government agencies and public enterprises. Also,
it excludes credits issued by central banks.
Regarding de￿ ation of the ￿nancial development indicators, while
￿nancial intermediary balance sheet items are measured at the end of
the year, GDP is measured over the year. Levine, Loayza, and Beck
(2000) de￿ ates end-of-year ￿nancial balance sheet items by end of year
consumer price indices (CPI) and de￿ ates the GDP series by the annual
CPI. Then, it computes the average of the real ￿nancial balance sheet
item in year t and t ￿ 1 and divide this average by real GDP measured
in year t.
Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) is an important contribution not
only for instrumenting ￿nancial development indicators in a cross-sectional
analysis, but also for its use of dynamic panel data estimation, as in Beck,
Levine and Loayza (2000). To exploit both time series and cross-section
variation, it employs data averaged over ￿ve-year periods, avoiding to
use data at annual frequency in order to attempt to capture long run
relationships. Panel data estimation makes it possible to take care of
cross-country heterogeneity and to instrument not only ￿nancial devel-
opment variables but also the variables belonging to the conditioning
set.
Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) uses the system GMM estimator
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and growth, while Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) examines the rela-
tionship between ￿nancial development and the sources of growth, i.e.,
productivity growth, physical capital accumulation, and savings.
Regarding the frequency of the data it is worth recalling that Beck
and Levine (2004) checks if the annual frequency of the data a⁄ected the
results compared to the ￿ve years one. They ￿nd that the relationship
between Bank Credit and growth disappears when moving to annual
data. Connecting this result to Loayza and Ranciere (2002), it argues
that short-run surges in Bank Credit are good predictors of banking
crises and slow growth, while high levels of Bank Credit over the long-run
are positively associated with economic growth. These results emphasize
the signi￿cance of using su¢ ciently low-frequency data to move beyond
cyclical e⁄ects.
It is instructive to consider more in depth the research strategy by
Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000). In order to control for other factors
associated with economic growth not linked to ￿nancial development,
they present regression results by using three di⁄erent conditioning sets:
￿ a simple conditioning information set, including the constant, the
logarithm of initial per capita GDP and initial level of educational
attainment;
￿ a policy conditioning information set, including the simple condi-
tioning information set plus measures of government size, in￿ ation,
the black market exchange rate premium, and openness to inter-
national trade;
￿ a full conditioning information set, including the policy condition-
ing information set plus measures of political stability (the num-
ber of revolutions and coups and the number of assassinations per
thousand inhabitants) and ethnic diversity.
Due to potential nonlinearities, the natural logarithms of the regres-
sors are considered when taking the models to the data.
To come to the literature regarding the ￿nance term structure, it has
mainly dealt with ￿rm level data of developing countries. On the one
hand, there are those thinking that pervasive market imperfections pre-
vent ￿rm in developing countries to have long-term relationships with
banks and, therefore, to ￿nance wide breath projects that lead to eco-
nomic growth. On the other hand, it has also been pointed out that short
term credit induce banks to take better control of borrowers and projects
and that public banks focusing on long term credit will have to face the
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short term credit can better re￿ ect new information, but long term credit
can protect ￿rms from creditors￿imperfect information and opportunis-
tic behavior as well as temporary shocks (Caprio and Demirg￿￿-Kunt,
1997; Diamond, 1991).
The dataset here analysed o⁄ers a particular standpoint to assess
the e⁄ect of ￿nance structure on growth because Italy is known for the
importance of small ￿rms, but also for the social ties that often connect
various ￿rms and ￿rms to banks on the ground of geographic proximity
leading to the formation of industrial districts (Observatory of Eruopean
SMEs, 2003a and 2003b; Becattini et al., 1992). These are two counter-
vailing forces as small ￿rms are usually discriminated when applying for
long term credit, but at the same time the milieu of industrial districts
may favour the formation of long term relationships between banks and
￿rms allowing to fund long term projects by short term credit.
All the studies above conclude that ￿nancial development plays a
￿rst-order role in explaining economic growth. However, both Man-
ning (2003) and Dri¢ l (2003) have recently argued that they may not
properly consider the role of country heterogeneity. Indeed these two
contributions observe that the e⁄ect of ￿nancial development on growth
disappears once inserting dummies for some subsets of countries either
according to the continent they belong to or because they had an out-
standing growth performance (the ￿Asian tigers￿ , for instance).
The results above lead Dri¢ l (2003) to conclude that New Economic
Geography may provide a better story regarding growth and catching
up, relying on agglomeration economies and transport costs. For this
reason, as stated above, assessing the impact of ￿nancial development
on growth at the regional level carries a particular interest.
3 Model Speci￿cation and Data Issues
I will accomplish this task considering a cross-sectional dataset of 94
Italian provinces. The model speci￿cation will be very similar to those
of King and Levine (1993 a, b, c) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000).
More speci￿cally I will adopt a model speci￿cation like (1), regressing the
percentage growth rate of per capita value added in the Italian provinces
(G) from 1986 to 2003 on a ￿nancial development indicator and a number
of controls.
Controls (X) include the sum of exports and imports over value
added in 1986 (EIY), the number of student enrolled in the secondary
school over local resident population in 1986 (STUDENTSPOP), the
value of ￿nished public infrastructures over value added in 1986 (OP-
PUBVA), the number of crimes per head (CRIMESH) and the level of
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will be de￿ ated by using the CPI measured in the region main city1.
Some more words need to be spent on the ratio of the sum of exports
and imports over value added. Given that this paper is concerned with
provinces, exports and imports only include international trade and not
trade with other Italian provinces, which is of course not registered at
the custom . However, more internationalised regions may achieve faster
growth by exploiting at best international comparative advantages, so it
appears advisable to include also this control.
As far as the indicators of ￿nancial development (F) are concerned
three possibilities are available:
￿ the ratio of bank liabilities over value added (DEPY);
￿ the ratio of total short term credit over value added (IMPY);
￿ the ratio of long-term credit over value added (LTIMPY)2.
Therefore, the measures of ￿nancial development here adopted are
very similar to PRIVY and DEPTH used by King and Levine (1993a,
b, c), with the exception of the distinction between short and long term
credit. To sum up, the variables involved (with their data sources in
parentheses) are:
￿ value added (Tagliacarne Institute);
￿ exports (ISTAT, the Italian national statistical o¢ ce);
￿ imports (ISTAT);
￿ in￿ ation measured in the region main city in CPI (ISTAT);
￿ the number of student enrolled in the secondary school (ISTAT);
￿ the value of ￿nished public infrastructures (ISTAT);
￿ the value of bank liabilites (Bank of Italy);
￿ the value of short term bank credit (Bank of Italy);
1Using the local CPI will entail a substantial loss of observations. Using the CPI of
the region main city, on the other hand, may introduce some measurement error in the
dependent variable but this kind of measurement does not a⁄ect coe¢ cient estimates
and standard errors (Wooldridge, 2001). VA0POP is not a⁄ected by measurement
error as 1986 is taken as base year.
2All the ￿nancial development indicators are measured in millions of lire over
hundreds of billions of lire.
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￿ the resident population (ISTAT).
4 Methods and Results
In this contribution I adopted the following research strategy for each
one of the three indicators of ￿nancial development above. In the ￿rst
place I performed OLS estimation. Then I checked for endogeneity of
￿nancial development indicators by performing the 2SLS estimator. I
used as instruments geographical dummies, after performing an F-test
regarding their correlation with the instrumented variables. Afterwards
I tested for endogeneity of the ￿nancial indicators by means of a Haus-
man test. In order to check for the validity of overidentifying restric-
tions, I also computed the test statistic given by the product between
the number of observations and the R2 of the regression of the residu-
als of the 2SLS estimator on the control variables and the instruments
(Wooldridge, 2001).
As the model speci￿cation does not include important regressors used
in the growth literature, such as government size, in order to control for
omitted variables, I grouped the data of the various provinces according
to the region they are in and I used the dataset as if it was an unbal-
anced panel, given that each region has a di⁄erent number of provinces.
This step is all the more important given that cross-sectional studies of
economic growth have been criticized because they cannot account, as
panel studies do, for the unboservable level of technology (Islam, 1995;
Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort, 1996; de la Fuente, 2002) and, while one
can think that major technological di⁄erences exist between regions, it
is unlikely that they are a very relevant factor within regions. Conse-
quently, following Baltagi (2003), I computed not only the Fixed E⁄ect
estimator but also ￿ve di⁄erent Random E⁄ect estimators: the Wallace
and Hussain one (WH), the Swamy and Arora one (SA), the Henderson,
Fuller and Batese one (HFB) and two MINQUE estimators (MQ0 and
MQA). In order to understand if the ￿xed e⁄ect estimator ￿ts the data
better than the random e⁄ect ones, I compared them by means of a
Hausman test. Finally, after Anselin (1988), for all the estimators but
2SLS I computed the Moran￿ s I statistic in order to check for spatial
correlation in the residuals. For 2SLS I relied on Anselin and Kelejian
(1997), given that instrumental variables estimators require a speci￿c
Moran￿ s I statistic.
Tables 1, 2 and 3 contain the results respectively about the ratio of
bank liabilities over value added (DEPY), the ratio of total short term
credit over value added (IMPY) and the ratio of long-term credit over
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Three general patterns clearly emerge. Financial variables are gener-
ally positively and signi￿cantly correlated with future real growth, their
endogeneity is rejected when comparing 2SLS and OLS and the ￿xed ef-
fect estimator appears to ￿t the data better than the random e⁄ect ones.
It is worth noting that instruments pass the F-test for correlation with
the instrumented variables at the 5% level for all the speci￿cations and
over-identifying restrictions could not be rejected. Furthermore, com-
paring di⁄erent Random E⁄ect estimators, it is possible to notice that
signi￿cant coe¢ cient estimates are pretty stable signalling the absence
of major speci￿cation problems. Finally, once moving from OLS to the
Fixed E⁄ect estimator, di⁄erently than in Dri¢ l (2003) and Manning
(2003), the coe¢ cients of the ￿nancial indicators remain positive and
signi￿cant and their point estimates do not change much. As far as the
￿nance structure is concerned, the coe¢ cient of LTIMPY is nearly the
double of that of IMPY, therefore long term credit appears to have a
greater impact on growth even in a country where industrial districts
may soften long term ￿nancial constraints for small ￿rms.
Table 1 shows two major exceptions to the general pattern above.
First, the ￿xed e⁄ect estimator does not ￿nd the coe¢ cient of DEPY to
be signi￿cantly di⁄erent than zero. However, once omitting insigni￿cant
dummy variables, its signi￿cance is restored (see the Fixed E⁄ect II
column). Second, the MQ0 estimator strongly accept the null of the
Hausman test. However, given that the tests for all the other estimators
point to the ￿xed e⁄ect estimator as the most suitable one, their result
appears to be more reliable. At any rate, coe¢ cient estimates do not
change much across di⁄erent estimators.
These results regarding the size of the banking sector can shed new
light on the impact of the functions of the ￿nancial sector on economic
growth. Levine (2004) points out that the functions of ￿nancial systems
are to:
￿ ￿produce information ex ante about possible investments and al-
locate capital;
￿ monitor investments and exert corporate governance after provid-
ing ￿nance;
￿ facilitate the trading, diversi￿cation and management of risk;
￿ mobilize and pool savings;
￿ ease the exchange of goods and services￿ .
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the hypotheses whether either the production of information regarding
investment opportunities or the monitoring role of banks or their risk
management function can have an impact on economic growth. However,
the size of the banking sector relative to the size of the economy is
de￿nitely an indicator of its ability to allocate capital, to mobilize and
pool savings and to ease the exchange of goods and services, so it is
possible to conclude that the more the ￿nancial system is able to provide
these functions and the more the economy will bene￿t from it in terms
of enhanced growth.
5 Conclusions
In this contribution I tested on a regional dataset the hypothesis that
the level of ￿nancial development, meant as size of the banking sector,
can be considered as a good predictor for future growth. This step was
desirable because:
￿ it can help to understand if the ￿nance growth nexus holds even at
the regional level, where its main theoretical competitor (the New
Economic Geography approach) ￿nds its most natural context;
￿ it allows to avoid pooling developed and developing countries, that
have widely di⁄erent experiences;
￿ it allows to check if the ￿nance-growth nexus hold even in highly
integrated ￿nancial markets, as those of a 146 years old monetary
union;
￿ it allows to test if long term credit has a greater impact on growth
than the short term one.
The results reached in this application point to the fact that the
size of the banking sector can be safely considered a good predictor for
future growth, especially when focusing on long term projects. Tests
for its endogeneity were rejected and the omission of relevant variables
(unobserved spatial heterogeneity) does not have major e⁄ects on its
estimated coe¢ cient.
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13Table 1 – The effect of financial development on real economic growth (DEPY) – Dependent variable: growth rate of per head value added 
 
            OLS  2SLS  Fixed 
Effects I 
Fixed 
Effects II  WH SA HFB MQ0 MQA
DEPY  4.56*                  7.55* 2.57 4.06* 3.82* 3.82* 3.65* 4.12* 3.72*
t-stat.                    (3.15) (3.19) (1.56) (3.02) (2.61) (2.76) (2.56) (2.79) (2.53)
EIY                    -1.72 -1.49 0.66 -0.01 -1.29 -1.29 -1.07 -1.55 -1.17
t-stat.                    (-0.92) (0.44) (0.36) (-0.01) (-0.72) (-0.76) (-0.62) (-0.84) (-0.66)
STUDENTSPOP 3.15                  3.72 -1.78 -0.13 1.80 1.81 1.28 2.53 1.52
t-stat.                    (1.20) (1.37) (-0.56) (0.05) (0.65) (0.70) (0.47) (0.92) (0.54)
PUBVA                    0.21* 0.26 0.03 0.07 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.15
t-stat.                    (2.12) (1.37) (0.23) (0.85) (1.66) (1.76) (1.53) (1.87) (1.55)
VA0POP                    -21.54* -26.61* -51.69* -42.25* -25.27* -25.25* -27.21* -23.00* -26.29*
t-stat.                    (-4.11) (-4.28) (-4.30) (-6.79) (-4.05) (-4.27) (-4.23) (-3.94) (-4.05)
CRIMESH                    -1.05 -1.61 2.93* 1.80 0.18 0.18 0.58 -0.41 0.40
t-stat.                    (-0.94) (-1.34) (2.15) (1.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.50) (-0.36) (0.34)
CONSTANT                    28.61* 18.41 - - 41.66* 41.59* 46.92* 34.65* 44.49*
t-stat.                   (1.78) (1.05) - - (2.33) (2.46) (2.62) (2.00) (2.43)
R
2 0.31                  0.28 0.61 0.53 - - - - -
MORAN’S I                       -0.41 -0.16 -0.58 - 0.54 0.54 0.66 0.38 0.61
HAUSMAN                    - 0.86 - - 0.00 0.01 0.03 1.00 0.00
IV F-test (p)  -  0.00  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
IV nR
2 (p)  -  0.22  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Observations                    94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
*: significant at the 5% level Table 2 – The effect of financial development on real economic growth (IMPY) – Dependent variable: growth rate of per head value added 
 
                OLS 2SLS Fixed 
Effects  WH SA HFB MQ0 MQA
IMPY  6.52*                10.85* 4.78* 5.82* 5.81* 5.53* 6.05* 5.67*
t-stat.                  (3.88) (3.30) (2.86) (3.54) (3.81) (3.55) (3.60) (3.46)
EIY                  -2.01 -1.96 0.55 -1.66 -1.65 -1.36 -1.83 -1.51
t-stat.                  (-1.10) (-1.04) (0.31) (-0.95) (-1.02) (-0.82) (-1.02) (-0.87)
STUDENTSPOP 0.76                -0.25 -3.09 -0.09 -0.12 -0.70 0.28 -0.40
t-stat.  (0.29)                (-0.09) (-1.04) (-0.03) (-0.05) (-0.27) (0.11) (-0.15)
PUBVA                  0.26* 0.33* 0.05 0.21* 0.21* 0.18* 0.23* 0.20*
t-stat.                  (2.57) (2.89) (0.42) (2.13) (2.29) (1.95) (2.28) (2.00)
VA0POP                  -22.71* -28.62* -57.36* -26.22* -26.36* -29.14* -24.60* -27.63*
t-stat.                  (-4.48) (-4.41) (-4.93) (-4.37) (-4.72) (-4.63) (-4.30) (-4.40)
CRIMESH                  -1.12 -1.72 2.68* -0.01 0.02 0.54 -0.40 0.28
t-stat.                  (-1.03) (-1.44) (2.14) (-0.01) (0.03) (0.50) (-0.35) (0.25)
CONSTANT                  47.21* 49.21* - 56.06* 56.39* 63.79* 52.11* 59.37*
t-stat.                  (3.17) (3.17) - (3.42) (3.70) (3.84) (3.24) (3.54)
R
2 0.35                0.30 0.64 - - - - -
MORAN’S I                     -0.25 -0.31 -0.49 0.48 0.49 0.67 0.38 0.58
HAUSMAN                  - 0.88 - 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
IV  F-test (p)                     - 0.02 - - - - - -
IV nR
2                    (p) - 0.13 - - - - - -
Observations                  94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
*: significant at the 5% level Table 3 – The effect of financial development on real economic growth (LTIMPY) – Dependent variable: growth rate of per head value added 
 
           OLS 2SLS  Fixed  Effect  WH SA HFB MQ0 MQA
LTIMPY  11.23*                18.73* 7.60* 10.41* 10.34* 9.78* 10.43* 10.09*
t-stat.                  (4.09) (3.00) (2.74) (3.86) (4.14) (3.81) (3.86) (3.79)
EIY                  -1.93 -1.84 0.37 -1.67 -1.65 -1.39 -1.68 -1.53
t-stat.                  (-1.07) (-0.97) (0.20) (-0.95) (-1.01) (-0.84) (-0.96) (-0.89)
STUDENTSPOP 0.33                -0.96 -3.39 -0.46 -0.53 -1.09 -0.45 -0.78
t-stat.                  (0.13) (-0.34) (-1.14) (-0.17) (-0.21) (-0.42) (-0.17) (-0.29)
PUBVA                  0.16 0.16 0.05 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.14
t-stat.                  (1.62) (1.58) (0.43) (1.54) (1.65) (1.47) (1.55) (1.49)
VA0POP                  -13.45* -13.23 -51.72* -18.12* -18.50* -21.99* -18.01* -20.01*
t-stat.                  (-3.01) (-2.84) (-4.46) (-3.27) (-3.55) (-3.67) (-3.26) (-3.42)
CRIMESH                  -2.41* -3.87 1.94 -1.33 -1.25 -0.63 -1.35 -0.97
t-stat.                  (-2.03) (-2.36) (1.41) (-1.09) (-1.11) (-0.53) (-1.11) (-0.79)
CONSTANT                  43.02* 42.23 - 51.46* 52.20* 58.89* 51.26* 55.10*
t-stat.                  (2.92) (2.74) - (3.18) (3.46) (3.62) (3.17) (3.34)
R
2 0.36                0.30 0.64 - - - - -
MORAN’S I                     -0.04 0.49 -0.39 0.60 0.62 0.80 0.60 0.70
HAUSMAN                  - 0.93 - 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
IV  F-test (p)                     - 0.02 - - - - - -
IV nR
2                    (p) - 0.68 - - - - - -
Observations                  94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
*: significant at the 5% level 
 